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The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia has become the most expensive World Cup in history, with 
its cost standing at more than US$ 13 billion. Russia gained new sports, transport and tourist 
infrastructure, and nearly 3 million foreign tourists came to the country to attend the matches. 
However, the investments and revenues connected with the tournament will have a minor im-
pact on Russia’s GDP growth rate; at best they may contribute to an acceleration in the devel-
opment of those regions (particularly the less affluent ones) that hosted the World Cup events. 
Predictably, the main beneficiary from the tournament’s organisation was President Putin’s 
business environment: companies controlled by Putin’s cronies won the main tenders for the 
construction of sports and transportation facilities.
For the purposes of the World Cup, the Russian leadership created an image of Russia as a coun-
try that is safe, modern and open to the world: they made sure that the organisation of sports 
events was efficient, security was guaranteed, visitors had various conveniences at their dispos-
al and that the attitude of law enforcement officers towards them was friendly. Paradoxically, 
the implementation of many of these arrangements was facilitated by Russia’s authoritarian 
model of governance, including a comprehensive law enforcement system the Kremlin has at 
its disposal and the state’s control of the key groups involved. Moscow has used this image, 
especially by including the enthusiastic opinions voiced by foreign football fans, as one of its 
soft power tools to contradict the negative image of Russia present in the narrative supported 
by Western politicians and media, and to solidify Russia’s position in the international arena. 
Moreover, Russia has used the presence of leaders from Western states, who attended various 
World Cup matches, to bolster its narrative emphasising the absence of unity among Western 
states and the rightfulness of Russia’s foreign policy stance. However, there is no indication that 
Russia’s improved image could have a measurable impact on the betterment of its relations with 
the West, which is confirmed, for example, by the extension of US-imposed sanctions. Similarly, 
in domestic politics the World Cup merely brought a temporary wave of enthusiasm within so-
ciety that quickly subsided, giving way to social discontent triggered by the government push-
ing through unpopular social reforms. The World Cup is now over and Russia is returning to its 
inveterate domestic problems and moving to another phase of its confrontation with the West.
The most expensive World Cup in history: 
the economic assessment 
According to official figures, in 2013–2018 
around 690 billion roubles (US$ 13.2 billion) 
was earmarked for the organisation of the 2018 
FIFA World Cup. It is worth noting that the tour-
nament-related expenses accounted for a mere 
1% of all investments in the Russian economy 
in 2013–2018. In contrast to the preparations 
for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, when 
the main financial burden was shouldered by 
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private investors, most expenditures connect-
ed with the football tournament were covered 
from the federal budget (around 60%) and re-
gional budgets (10%) and the share of expenses 
covered by private investors was limited (30%). 
Most funds were spent on the construction and 
modernisation of transportation infrastruc-
ture (US$ 6 billion), mainly rail and airports. 
US$ 3.5 billion was spent on sports infrastruc-
ture – 12 stadiums in 11 cities in the European 
part of Russia were built or modernised. Anoth-
er US$ 1 billion was spent on the preparation 
of accommodation facilities for football fans. 
Other investments were carried out by region-
al governments, particularly in the most af-
fluent regions (Moscow, Saint Petersburg). As 
a consequence, the 2018 FIFA World Cup organ-
ised by Russia has become the most expensive 
World Cup in history. Previous World Cups or-
ganised by Brazil and South Africa cost around 
US$ 11.5 billion and US$ 6 billion, respectively.
Just as in the case of the Winter Olympics in 
Sochi, the main beneficiaries of tenders for the 
construction of sports and transportation facil-
ities included companies controlled by Vladimir 
Putin’s cronies. Stroytransgaz, owned by Gen-
nady Timchenko, was the contractor responsi-
ble for the construction of the stadiums in Vol-
gograd and Nizhny Novgorod, with the total 
value of its contracts reaching 32.9 billion rou-
bles (nearly US$ 500 million when calculated ac-
cording to the present exchange rate). Mosto- 
trest and Transtroymekhanizatsiya, owned by 
Arkady Rotenberg, carried out investments 
worth 351 billion roubles (US$ 5.2 billion, calcu-
lated according to the present exchange rate), 
which included the reconstruction of airports in 
Nizhny Novgorod and Rostov-on-Don, and the 
construction of a section of the Moscow–Saint 
Petersburg trunk route. The investment plans 
were curbed by the economic crisis that hit 
the Russian economy in late 2014. The costs 
of investments financed from the state budget 
grew rapidly and the quality of their execution 
frequently sparked controversy1. For example, 
an air of scandal surrounded the construction 
of a stadium in Saint Petersburg, financed from 
the municipal budget and carried out by Trans-
stroy, a company controlled by oligarch Oleg 
Deripaska2. The stadium turned out to be the 
most expensive World Cup facility, with its 
cost increasing seven-fold during its eleven-
year-long construction versus the initial cost 
estimate. This was accompanied by multiple 
problems that emerged during its use. These 
included a leaking roof, which, according to 
a widely ridiculed statement by the deputy may-
or of Saint Petersburg, had been caused by the 
“destructive actions” of cormorants. Despite 
these problems, the facilities were finished on 
time and the World Cup events were held with 
no disruptions.
The World Cup’s final economic assessment 
will likely be made no sooner than the end of 
2018. The agreement Russia has signed with 
FIFA (whose provisions have not been revealed) 
entitles it to a partial reimbursement of costs. 
The amount to be reimbursed to the tourna-
ment organiser by FIFA may even reach around 
US$ 600 million. The Russian Federation is also 
entitled to a share of the profits from the sale 
of tickets for specific matches (total revenue is 
estimated at around US$ 780 million, 50% of 
which is likely to be earned by the organiser). 
1 С. Титов, Миллиардеры на футболе. Инвесторы 
и подрядчики чемпионата мира из списка Forbes, 
Forbes.ru, 11 June 2018, http://www.forbes.ru/milliard-
ery-photogallery/362903-milliardery-na-futbole-14-in-
vestorov-i-podryadchikov-chempionata 
2 Золотой стадион Дерипаски и Андреева, РусПрес, 
18 July 2018, www.rospres.com/government/19012/ 
The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia 
has become the most expensive World 
Cup in history, with its cost exceeding 
US$ 13 billion.
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Alongside this, money earned from tourism will 
account for a major portion of Russia’s World 
Cup-related revenue. According to recent esti-
mates, during their stay in Russia tourists spent 
around 140 million roubles (around US$ 2.1 mil-
lion). Data compiled by the Association of Rus-
sian Tourist Agencies indicates that around 5.7 
million tourists, including 2.9 million foreign 
tourists, visited the World Cup’s host cities. 
630 000 of them (originating mainly from China, 
the USA and Latin America) entered Russia us-
ing their Fan ID. According to data compiled 
by the Border Service of the Russian Federa-
tion, the World Cup has not led to an increase 
in the number of foreigners coming to Russia. 
During the tournament around 5 million for-
eigners entered Russia, as many as in the same 
period in the previous year. Moscow, which is 
Russia’s main tourist attraction and transport 
hub, was visited by around 4.5 million tourists.
Transport carriers were unable to fully prof-
it from the increased tourist traffic (Moody’s 
rating agency estimates that the carriers’ rev-
enue increased by just 3%), since the Russian 
government wanted to prevent an excessive in-
crease in fare prices and forced through various 
preferential offers for passengers. For example, 
Russian Rail made 734 trains available to tour-
ists and offered free travel to and from elev-
en host cities. 319 000 football fans used this 
transportation opportunity3. 
The Central Bank of Russia estimates that in 
2018 the World Cup will boost Russia’s GDP 
growth by a mere 0.1–0.2% (in 2018 the total 
expected GDP growth rate is 1.5–2%), mainly 
3 Бесплатные поезда РЖД перевезли около 319 тыс. 
болельщиков во время ЧМ-2018, Агентство Городских 
Новостей Москва, 18 July 2018, https://www.mskagen-
cy.ru/materials/2800430 
due to revenue earned by the retail trade sec-
tor, hotels and some transportation operators. 
As far as World Cup host regions are concerned 
(especially less affluent ones, such as Mordo-
via), their Gross Regional Product may increase 
by as much as 1–2%. Economists do not expect 
any significant long-term impact the World Cup 
might have on the Russian economy. An analy-
sis prepared by the government indicates that 
over the next several years the benefits from 
using new infrastructure, mainly in the sectors 
of transportation and tourism, will increase 
Russia’s GDP by around US$ 2.5–3.5 billion an-
nually, i.e. much less than 1% GDP4. At the same 
time, maintenance of sports infrastructure will 
be a burden on public finances. Average main-
tenance costs of each stadium are estimated at 
300–370 million roubles (US$ 4.5–5.5 million) 
annually. Since most regions will be unable to 
finance the maintenance of sports infrastruc-
ture5, the necessary funds will be earmarked 
for this purpose in the federal budget (around 
US$ 200 million by 2023). The maintenance of 
stadiums built using federal budget funds will 
cost the state around 13 billion roubles (nearly 
US$ 200 million) in total.
Russia’s export image
An important element underlying positive 
opinions regarding the World Cup in Russia, 
as voiced by both foreign visitors and Russian 
citizens, was the capable handling of their du-
ties on the part of Russian law enforcement 
services (100 000 interior ministry officers were 
involved in keeping public order). The polite at-
titude of police officers during the tournament 
stood in sharp contrast to their extremely bad 
image resulting from their repressive actions 
during street protests and at police stations. 
4 Zob. И. Ткачёв, О. Макаров, Правительство оценило 
эффект от чемпионата мира по футболу для 
экономики, RBC, 25 April 2018, www.rbc.ru/econom-
ics/25/04/2018/5ae0462b9a79471c87890447
5 For Mordovia, the annual stadium maintenance spending 
would account for around 10% of the region’s revenue.
The World Cup will have a minor impact 
on the Russian economy.
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Although they reacted decisively to the few in-
cidents that happened, the police and other law 
enforcement services showed an ostentatiously 
polite and helpful attitude towards football fans 
– social media were full of reports by astonished 
Russians who expressed disbelief at the change 
in police behaviour and wished that the World 
Cup would last forever. 
The services managed to guarantee a high lev-
el of security during the tournament events, 
both in terms of the terrorist threat and the risk 
of riots among groups of football fans6. The 
‘taming’ of Russian football hooligans, who 
became notorious for the riots they had pro-
voked during the UEFA Euro 2016 champion-
ships in France, was also of major importance. 
Some commentators viewed the behaviour of 
Russian hooligans in France as inspired by the 
Russian government7, and pointed to close ties 
between Alexandr Shpyrgin, the head of the 
Russian Football Fans Organisation, and promi-
nent Russian politicians8. During the World Cup 
in Russia, Shpyrgin alongside many other foot-
ball hooligans were denied Fan IDs and their 
conciliatory attitude may suggest that it had 
been agreed on. The Russian government had 
also previously managed to tame hooliganism 
6 For more see http://www.interfax.ru/wc2018/619056 
7 It has been emphasised for example that Moscow had 
banned only 30 Russian hooligans from travelling to 
World Cup matches in France and Shpyrgin himself was 
a member of the official delegation. The French prosecu-
tor who investigated the riots argued that Russian hooli-
gans appeared to have been excellently trained to carry 
out violent and brutal actions and then to flee instantly, 
Wie sich russische Politiker mit Hooligans solidarisieren, 
VICE Sport, 14 June 2016, https://sports.vice.com/de/
article/z4pm3a/wie-sich-russische-politiker-mit-hooli-
gans-solidarisieren 
8 The Russian Football Fans Organisation was established 
in 2007 under the patronage of Vitali Mutko, then head 
of the Russian Football Association and close friend 
of President Putin. In the past, Shpyrgin was a member of 
neo-Nazi organisations and was closely associated with the 
Moscow-based football club Dynamo (established by the 
NKVD). He was also a member of Vladimir Zhyrinovsky’s 
party LDPR and had a meeting with Vladimir Putin. Groups 
of football fans were used to carry out physical attacks 
on opposition. A. Богомолов, Околофутбол, деньги, 
власть: почему российские фанаты не свергнут Путина, 
Forbes.ru, 6 May 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-col-
umn/protesty/256591-okolofutbol-dengi-vlast-pochemu-
rossiiskie-fanaty-ne-svergnut-putina 
during other international sports champion-
ships organised in Russia (the 2017 FIFA Con-
federations Cup), which confirms that it has 
effective mechanisms to manage football fan 
groups at its disposal. In addition, around 
3 000 foreign fans having a record for violation 
of public order during sports events were de-
nied entry to Russia9. As a consequence, only 
isolated minor incidents occurred during the 
World Cup, including a brawl with the partici-
pation of Argentinian fans in Nizhny Novgorod 
and an act of vandalism on a train carried out 
by a drunk English fan. These incidents were 
not publicised and the troublemaking fans re-
ceived only token punishments.
The Russian government has also introduced 
a series of improvements for football fans vis-
iting Russia. Holders of Fan IDs were offered 
visa-free entry to Russia that was later prolonged 
until the end of 2018, to encourage tourists to 
revisit Russia. Despite the official tightening of 
migration policy for the duration of the World 
Cup, including the shortening of the deadline 
for foreigners to report and register their stay 
in Russia from seven to three days, Russian 
services seemed to enforce the new laws with 
moderate diligence, even though usually they 
are much tougher and frequently treat this re-
quirement as an opportunity to solicit bribes10. 
9 Российские власти не пустили на чемпионат по 
футболу 3000 иностранцев, „Ведомости”, 18 July 2018, 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2018/07/18/ 
775861-chempionat-mira
10 During the World Cup, a mere 50% of fans stayed in hotels 
that observed the required registration rules. Other fans 
who stayed in rented flats or at their friends’ places were 
obliged to report their stay at special offices. However, in 
practice, few of them were aware of this requirement.
The government has introduced a series of 
improvements for tourists and spirited away 
Russian football hooligans, while the polite 
attitude of police officers stood in sharp 
contrast to their bad image domestically.
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Therefore, it can be said that football fans were 
treated leniently, in line with the instructions the 
police had received from their supervisors.
Despite increased passenger traffic, the visiting 
fans had no problems accessing specific sta-
diums and host cities. Efficient transportation 
was guaranteed by Russian carriers that offered 
free fares. The Russian government introduced 
a ban on holding rallies in the World Cup host 
cities for the duration of the tournament. In 
this way, the Russian authorities prevented the 
situation familiar in democratic states in which 
large-scale events are often accompanied by 
transportation disturbances, caused for in-
stance by strikes organised by airport and rail 
employees fighting for their rights.
The political benefits for the Kremlin
The Russian leadership treated the World Cup 
as an opportunity to solidify Russia’s position 
in the international arena and as an instrument 
of soft power to spread a positive image of 
Russia in Western societies. The Kremlin intend-
ed to present Russia to the world as an effi-
ciently functioning modern state that has not 
yielded to Western sanctions and demonstrat-
ed that it was capable of organising a large-
scale sports event in an exemplary manner. 
Russia was repeatedly praised by football man-
agers (FIFA President Gianni Infantino con-
sidered this tournament “the best World Cup 
in history”), foreign media (some referred to 
Russia as “the real winner of the champion-
ships”) and numerous visitors. The Russian nar-
rative of success was boosted by the fact that 
the Kremlin-feared boycott of the tournament 
announced by Western statesdid not happen. 
In the VIP boxes, presidents of France, Portugal 
and Croatia, kings of Belgium and Spain, as well 
as the prime minister of Hungary, watched the 
matches in the company of President Vladimir 
Putin and Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev. 
The Russian narrative interpreted this as the 
Western states’ departure from their unified 
stance on Russia. The presence of Western pol-
iticians confirmed the Russian government in 
their conviction that Russia’s foreign policy is 
effective. It was also used to emphasise that 
Russia is not isolated. 
One of the most important results of the World 
Cup was that Russia could be presented to the 
world as an attractive, safe and tourist-friendly 
country. Foreign fans “were positively shocked” 
to see clean and tidy cities with a wide array 
of culinary attractions and entertainment op-
portunities. They were particularly impressed 
by Moscow and Saint Petersburg, including 
by their “European” and “world-class” ap-
peal. It seems that the enthusiastic opinions on 
the part of foreigners resulted not only from 
Russia’s excellent preparation for the tourna-
ment and its numerous tourist attractions, but 
also from the guests’ sparse knowledge of Rus-
sia (for most of them this was their first trip 
there) and low expectations inspired by Russia’s 
negative image in most Western media. Enthu-
siastic views expressed by tourists on social me-
dia stood in sharp contrast to the previous at-
titude of Western media and politicians critical 
of Russia11. Russian propaganda was eager to 
use the positive viewpoints of foreign tourists 
for its own purposes and to accuse the West of 
spreading anti-Russian propaganda12.
11 Note the meaningful account given by a British fan on 
Twitter: “Back from 2 weeks in Russia alive. I wasn’t 
attacked by blood thirsty hooligans, I wasn’t eaten by 
a bear & I haven’t been poisoned or killed. The British 
media should be ashamed of themselves for their clear 
propaganda against the Russian people. Absolutely 
class country”.
12 Брифинг официального представителя МИД России 
М.В.Захаровой, www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/as-
set_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3280395#1
The Kremlin intended to present Russia as 
an efficiently functioning modern state that 
has not yielded to Western sanctions and 
was capable of organising a large-scale 
sports event in an exemplary manner.
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At the same time, for Russian society, the 
World Cup became an opportunity to confront 
the Kremlin’s anti-Western narrative by means 
of direct contacts with visitors from the USA, 
Europe and other ‘hostile’ countries. A multi-
national crowd of football fans was happy to 
interact with local residents who joined in the 
carnival-like fun13. Nikolskaya street in Moscow, 
adjacent to the Red Square, became a symbol 
of joint festivities that continued day and night. 
Both foreign and Russian media and the inter-
net were full of photos showing foreign visitors 
and Russians, young ones in particular, having 
fun together. Numerous stereotypes about 
Russia, alongside some actual shortcomings, 
were turned into sources of humour, which only 
enhanced the good mood14. Opinion polls have 
recorded a change in the mood of the Russian 
public – in July 2018, for the first time in several 
years, more respondents reported a positive at-
titude towards the West than negative, and the 
proportion of individuals who were critical of 
the USA and the EU dropped by 20 percentage 
points compared to May 201815.
13 Смех без причины: почему мы так мало улыбаемся, 
a Radio Svoboda broadcast, Svoboda.org, 27 June 2018, 
www.svoboda.org/a/29323838.html
14 A massive pothole has become a tourist attraction in 
Nizhny Novgorod with foreign visitors eagerly taking 
pictures of themselves in it. In a quick reaction, local 
government officials had the pothole paved, which trig-
gered a wave of thanks from local residents to prank-lov-
ing tourists. Stereotypes about Russia were used as in-
spiration for various pranks – both male and female fans 
paraded around the streets wearing kokoshniks (tradi-
tional women’s headgear), jokes were cracked about 
polar bears temporarily hiding out from tourists etc. 
15 A poll by Levada Centre entitled “Russia and the West” 
of 2 August 2018, www.levada.ru/2018/08/02/rossi-
ya-i-zapad-3/
The Kremlin has used Russian society’s inter-
est in the World Cup and the euphoria trig-
gered by the successful performance of the 
Russian team16 to push through unpopular 
reforms. On the World Cup opening day, the 
Russian government adopted draft laws on 
raising the retirement age and the VAT rate17. 
The government used the football champi-
onships to ‘cover’ the protests against the 
pension reform organised by various social 
groups, trade unions and opposition. The ban 
on holding rallies in host cities, which was in 
force during the World Cup, was another factor 
that helped to reduce the size of the protests. 
In contrast to what Russian pro-democracy 
groups expected, the World Cup had no impact 
on the government’s attitude in matters relat-
ed to human rights violations reported in for-
eign media. These include the prolonged hun-
ger strike of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov 
and the initiation of criminal proceedings 
against Yuri Dmitriev, a recognised researcher 
of Stalinist-era terror.
The Kremlin’s assessment: upsides and 
downsides of the World Cup
Russia has spent more on organising the World 
Cup than any other nation in the tournament’s 
history. This has translated into an unquestion-
able marketing success for the Russian Feder-
ation. However, it has had a negligible impact 
on the country’s economic development. The 
newly-built infrastructure, including trans-
portation facilities, may have a positive im-
pact on economic activity, including tourism. 
16 Around 75% of respondents followed the World Cup 
developments, whereas back in April only 52% intended 
to do so. One of the reasons behind increased interest 
in the championships was the good performance of the 
Russian team that unexpectedly made it to the quarter-
finals. A poll by Levada Centre regarding society’s inter-
est in the World Cup in Russia of 30 July 2018, www.
levada.ru/2018/07/30/chempionat-mira-po-futbolu-vni-
manie-i-otsenki/
17 The retirement age is to be increased from 55 to 60 years 
for women and from 60 to 65 years for men. The VAT 
rate is to be increased by 2 percentage points to 20%.
The impact of the World Cup on the West’s 
policy towards Russia will be negligible, 
which is confirmed by another set of US 
sanctions; nor will this event compensate 
for the domestic problems and cover un-
popular reforms.
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This particular aspect is of major importance 
for poorer regions in the European part of Rus-
sia, which could not have hoped for a similar 
inflow of investments and tourists were it not 
for the World Cup.
Paradoxically, the instruments deployed by an 
authoritarian state have enabled the Kremlin to 
use the World Cup as an opportunity to ‘fabri-
cate’ the image of Russia as a safe and modern 
country that is open to the world. Strict control 
of the law enforcement agencies has helped 
the state to guarantee a high level of security, 
to give the impression of genial and obliging 
law enforcement services to foreign football 
fans and to spirit away Russian football hoo-
ligans for the duration of the World Cup. The 
Kremlin has used the fact that Western lead-
ers watched the matches from VIP boxes to 
challenge the view that Russia is being isolat-
ed and to emphasise the deepening divisions 
in the West. This impression has been boosted 
by the meeting between Vladimir Putin and US 
President Donald Trump, held immediately af-
ter the end of the World Cup. In a Twitter mes-
sage, Trump referred to the World Cup in Russia 
as ‘a truly great World Cup Tournament – one 
of the best ever!’. However, the impact of the 
World Cup on the West’s actual policy to-
wards Russia will be limited or even negligible, 
which is confirmed, for example, by another 
set of sanctions the US subsequently imposed 
on Russia in August 201818.
18 For more see: M. Menkiszak, W. Rodkiewicz, I. Wiśniewska, 
Kij i marchewka: USA oferują Rosji sankcje i dialog, 
„Analizy OSW”, 9 August 2018, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2018-08-09/kij-i-marchewka-usa-
oferuja-rosji-sankcje-i-dialog
Similarly, in domestic politics the success 
achieved in connection with ‘circuses’ will not 
eliminate the shortage of ‘bread’. The Kremlin’s 
strategy, which involved using the World Cup 
to draw a veil over unpopular reforms, may only 
bring short-term results. Despite the restrictions 
related to the World Cup, a wave of protests 
against the pension reforms has swept across 
the country and another wave is expected in 
the autumn. President Putin’s approval rating 
has dropped and a pessimistic mood is on the 
rise in society19. Citizens fear that Russian police 
and the security services might return to their 
previous repressive behaviour, which is particu-
larly important in the context of street protests. 
The endurance of the Kremlin’s anti-Western 
propaganda has been put to the test – meet-
ings with joyful and friendly foreigners have 
had a major impact on Russian society’s atti-
tude towards the West.
Despite the fact that the World Cup has been 
an unquestioned public relations success for the 
Kremlin, it has not changed Russia’s economic 
and geopolitical situation, nor has it eliminated 
the country’s domestic social problems. Russia’s 
future relations with the West will mainly be de-
termined by the actual shape of Russian domes-
tic politics, including the increasingly authori-
tarian model of governance and the aggressive 
anti-Western foreign policy that pro-Putin elites 
use to legitimise their status. 
19 Since April 2018, the president’s approval rating has 
dropped from 82% to 67% (July 2018), and the pro-
portion of respondents who assess the development of 
the situation in Russia as positive dropped from 60% to 
48%; 40% of surveyed individuals assess the situation 
as negative. For more see: a poll by Levada Centre re-
garding society’s support for institutions of the state of 
31 July 2018, https://www.levada.ru/2018/07/31/odo-
brenie-institutov-vlasti-3/
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The 2018 FIFA World Cup: stadiums (the construction cost in billions of roubles)
MAP
Source: RBC, 8 June 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/society/08/06/2018/5b02f8039a7947289e44a869
During the preparations for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, the rouble lost 50% of its value. At the beginning of 2014, 1 US$ cost 
32 roubles, whereas in early June 2018 it cost 62 roubles.
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